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ABSTRACT 
 Delivering on the power of data to ships in austere or contested environments 
requires careful consideration of system capacity, bandwidth, and processes to drive 
capability. Ship-based and shore-based applications and processes must be married into a 
system that progressively improves own-ship algorithms in real time and fleetwide 
algorithms in near real-time. Once this operational picture is achieved, system readiness 
becomes a known value and a decision aid rather than a set of derived metrics. 
Additionally, real-time mission posture assessment becomes a “must do” prior to the 
execution of a mission. 
 This paper identifies the current state of mission readiness assessment and 
ultimately fills a known gap within naval combat systems by laying out a shipboard and 
shore-based architecture used to translate information into action. In doing so, the study 
addresses information configuration management and processes needed to synthesize 
multiple disparate data sets into an eventual adaptive operational readiness assessment 
based on mission need. 
 This paper develops a conceptual design and model using Innoslate and other 
tools that establishes data nodes, data interrelationships, and a high-level data 
management operational viewpoint. The conceptual model will be analyzed to study 
Operational Availability (Ao) and Probability of Successful Mission (Psm) improvements 
in operational scenarios. 
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As naval combat systems continue to grow in complexity and capability, new ways 
of characterizing system readiness are required to maintain a competitive edge. Naval 
combat systems are a combination of multiple individual systems designed to deliver multi-
mission offensive and defensive capability. Levels of readiness required to achieve this 
capability are often defined in multiple ways, by multiple entities, and are defined once 
during design and poorly managed over the life-cycle.  In order to apply advanced concepts 
of readiness assessment, a group of new systems is necessary to achieve real-time 
readiness.  
This paper investigates the nature of mission planning, current methods of assessing 
system readiness, application of standards in allocating functional and physical capability 
to tasks and missions, and develops a broad conceptual architecture that enables a seamless 
flow of data from ship to shore and back.  
By applying the processes laid out by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), this paper 
applies needs analysis, operational requirements definition, functional analysis, and finally 
conceptual architecture and analysis.   
This conceptual architecture defines four systems: 1) the Mission-based 
Operational Effectiveness Tool, which assess combat system readiness in real time, 2) the 
Satellite Data Transmission System, which transmits stored health, status, and 
environmental data, 3) the Shore-based Data Storage and Access System, which stores 
information and brokers access to aggregated fleet data, and 4) the Product Lifecycle 
Management System, which houses authoritative system suitability measures and software 
baselines. These systems come together to enable real-time own-ship combat system 
readiness assessment, near real-time fleet level assessment, and longer term software and 
supportability product lifecycle management of all naval combat systems. 
In establishing this architecture, the resulting conceptual system of systems also 
positions naval systems to apply advanced techniques in artificial intelligence, machine 
xviii 
learning, and systems engineering to aid users in real time performance assessment and aid 
experts in detailed system of systems optimization. 
The paper details specific conceptual requirements needed to enable both shipboard 
and shore-based systems that enable execution, and these requirements could be used as a 
starting point for future combat system software baseline capability enhancement. 
Lastly, the paper defines areas for additional study and follow-on work that would 
further aid in defining system operational requirements and system context in multi-
service, multi-mission environments. 
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Naval systems continue to grow increasingly complex and have become 
increasingly integrated (Moreland 2015). Naval ships are designed to operate for several 
decades and during this timeframe, new technology capabilities are integrated onto them 
that can provide significant operational improvements.  Recent technology advancements 
in system diagnostics provide an opportunity for the Navy to benefit from systems that can 
self-diagnose their health and identify faults.  These capabilities can provide data that 
enable the Navy to quickly and efficiently assess operational readiness at the system level, 
at the system of systems level, and at the force level.  This thesis conducted a systems 
engineering analysis of this problem domain with the objective of developing a conceptual 
data architecture to gather and process system diagnostic data to support operational 
readiness assessments. 
The measure of naval system readiness is often too-constrictively defined as a 
single required value. This greatly limits system design as well as system utilization during 
operations. Naval systems are designed to meet these singular requirements that are 
established during the acquisition phase; but, during operations, these singular values 
become standards that must be met by the naval systems in order to be deemed 
operationally available.  Many system requirements related to readiness are better specified 
as a range of acceptable values.  Moreover, a system is often viewed through a binary lens 
of being “up” or “down,” with a possible third assessment of being “degraded.” In a 
complex tactical environment full of intelligent, self-reporting systems, these assessments 
do not meet the need for a well-planned mission. 
The measure of naval system readiness is highly dependent on the mission(s) at 
hand, as well as environmental and external factors. The probability of naval mission 
success (Psm) may be impacted by a number of factors, as shown in Figure 1. These factors 
include the operating environment, the stress of the mission scenario itself, the number of 
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available systems to achieve an objective, and the health and status of the naval systems in 
a ship’s configuration. 
  
Figure 1. Effects on Probability of Successful Mission of a 
Combat System 
Conceptually, these myriad factors could serve as data inputs to a capability that 
could translate them into meaningful outputs at both a shipboard and shore-based level, 
such as a continuous analysis of naval ship readiness, and predictive projections of 
successful operations according to warfare area.  
Under general circumstances, Operational Availability (Ao) in acquisition can be 
tracked by specifying requirements to meet target objective or threshold values under a set 
of ground rules and assumptions that include: 
1. Reliability of a system under design 
2. Maintainability of a system under design  
3. An assumption of a logistics delay time based on the criticality of failure 
4. A design reference mission to baseline the analysis 
However, the current naval tactical fleet Ao assessments are deficient in their ability 



















The naval surface community is beginning to study and employ both design-driven 
and data-driven techniques that have been applied in other areas, such as the commercial 
and defense aviation community. Examples of design-driven techniques include the 
Ingested Debris Monitoring System (IDMS) and the Exhaust Debris Monitoring System 
(EDMS) (Powrie and Novis 2006) in the F-35. Data-driven techniques have been employed 
in the Airbus A350, which uses two modules called “Expert” and “Prognostics and Risk 
Management,” designed to analyze over 400,000 input parameters to either identify 
degradation of performance or apply statistical analysis to system health (Canaday 2016) 
Successful product life cycle management, data management, and analysis must be 
treated as the “force multipliers” that they are. This planning, acquisition, and integration 
process requires careful and complete coordination amongst numerous program offices, 
original equipment manufacturers, combat system integrators, and sponsors (DeLuca 
2013). Moreover, it requires careful coordination of investments, infrastructure, and 
capabilities. 
A holistic shipboard and shore-based conceptual capability would require a few key 
tasks to be performed to frame the problem set: 1) understand how missions are created, 2) 
define mission essential tasks and capabilities, 3) allocate systems and standards to mission 
success, 4) establish infrastructure to utilize vast amounts of system generated data, and 5) 
apply a framework to optimize mission performance. 
Naval operators are continuously adjusting operations plans as a result of variable 
inputs and constraints (Department of the Navy 2005). At a tactical level, these inputs and 
constraints are more clearly defined than at a strategic level. To compete in a near-peer 
tactical environment (Mattis 2018) naval combat systems must utilize system-generated 
information in a way that contributes to increased readiness, faster and more confident 
decision making, and a capability that is adaptive enough to ingest new inputs and alter the 
course of battle preparation. 
This thesis studied the utilization of advanced planning and digital techniques at 
sea and process techniques ashore to establish a conceptual design and architecture 
incorporating a broad, cyclical flow of information to enable own-ship and fleet-wide 
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readiness knowledge and self-awareness. Figure 2 provides an operational viewpoint (OV-
1) of the thesis’ conceptual capability. 
 
Figure 2. OV-1: Cyclical Flow of Information to Support 
Real-Time Readiness Assessment 
Via this ship and shore infrastructure, the study developed a framework from which 
a mission-based operational assessment is defined and the thresholds of performance of 
naval assets at the force level are identified and continually optimized. The operational 
picture is achieved, and system readiness becomes a known value and a decision aid rather 
than a set of derived metrics.  
B. STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study was to develop a conceptual design of a system 
architecture to provide a naval operational readiness assessment capability.  The study 
sought to accomplish this objective by examining: 
• how current naval operational plans and assessments are generated 
• ways to calculate the likelihood of success in these plans 
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• how to incorporate the effects of naval missions, the environment, and 
other external factors into operational readiness assessments 
• how to leverage acquired system self-diagnostic data to enable a 
conceptual architecture that provides adaptive and timely operational 
readiness assessment 
C. STUDY SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS, AND CONSTRAINTS 
The scope of the study was focused on Navy ships and shipboard systems.  The 
study used a generic surface ship combat system as an example, based on the Aegis Combat 
System, which is a multi-mission system of systems designed to meet a wide array of 
offensive and defensive capabilities (DeLuca et al. 2013). By referencing a generic combat 
system, key concepts are communicated in a way that would be achievable and executable 
on any surface ship. 
In order to conceptualize an operational readiness assessment architecture for such 
a complex naval system of systems (SoS), the study made the following overarching 
assumptions: 
• that alignment of program offices and combat system development 
activities is actively taking place at both executive and working levels 
• that a Combat System Engineering Activity (CSEA) is utilized as an 
integrated design agent that actively and successfully coordinates combat 
system and element interface requirements 
• that requirements do not yet exist to transmit adequate and accurate 
information across the Local Area Network and from ship to shore 
• that the combat system and ship are provided an interface to ingest 
variable mission sets and adjust expected levels of performance as 
necessary. 
• that hardware and software engineers can and will successfully apply 
theory in areas of physics and failure propagation 
• that Program Executive Offices are willing and able to invest in central, 
singular infrastructure that tracks system suitability metrics in a product 




Study constraints included: 
• limitations on local area network bandwidth due to higher priority, tactical 
latency allocations will constrain operational effectiveness tools  
• variability in bandwidth from ship to shore will not facilitate immediate 
and complete upload of system data to remote locations 
• complexity of an acknowledged system of systems (Baldwin 2008), in 
which multiple stakeholders will create an environment will make it 
difficult to coordinate effectively 
• capability for robust modeling and simulation will not exist at a shipboard 
level 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This project applied systems engineering methods from Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2011) to analyze the Navy’s needs for operational readiness assessments and to develop a 
conceptual design solution that addresses this need.  The methodology started with a known 
problem and translated it into a set of requirements that led to a functional architecture and 
conceptual architecture design.  The steps in the systems engineering methodology were:  
1. Identify problems and translate them into a definition of need, where 
existing processes, capabilities, and user needs were assessed, and gaps 
defined. 
2. Identify and analyze system operational requirements, where systems were 
contextualized, and high-level conceptual requirements were developed. 
3. Conduct a functional analysis, where the system functions and interactions 
were defined and placed into functional flows. 
4. Study technologies and develop a conceptual design solution, where a 
total conceptual design was generated, and user interactions were defined 
and abstracted.  
E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Developing a data architecture and approach for assessing combat readiness for the 
fleet provides critical input into tactical decisions. This study performed a needs analysis, 
requirements analysis, functional analysis, and conceptual design of a technology solution 
and data architecture for a naval fleet capability that assesses system-level and force-level 
7 
readiness for ship systems and determines the probability of mission success given variable 
inputs.  
The study developed a conceptual future fleet capability that has the potential to 
improve future mission planning, multi-ship coordination, and tactical operations by 
providing self-awareness of warfare assets and combat readiness knowledge.  
The results of this systems engineering analysis facilitate further requirements 
definition and contractual action and will guide future combat system baseline 
development efforts related to integrated and dynamic readiness assessment. Moving 
forward, the results of this study provide a foundation of knowledge that can lead to 
developing incremental software baseline updates and an approach to gradually introduce 
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II. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In binding the problem set, one must recognize the current state, the definition of 
need, and the future state. Defining the current state includes understanding how missions 
are planned and created at the strategic level and at the tactical level, how the probability 
of success is determined, and what inputs are used to create useable outputs.  
This analysis enables the next step, which is that of applying a conceptual 
framework to applying a recommended solution set to the two primary application areas, 
which are that of a shipboard architecture and a shore-based architecture, working together 
to achieve seamless and continuous update. 
By understanding the needs from both a capability perspective and a user 
perspective, a complete needs-based solution can be generated by applying theories of 
supportability analysis, mission engineering, and machine learning. 
B. NAVAL READINESS 
When assessing a surface ship for initial estimates on whether it will be able to 
achieve a commander’s intent, the state of combat system readiness plays a primary role 
for most missions of great consequence.  
However, readiness within the Department of Defense takes on broad meaning. 
Readiness can include training, manning, supply, hardware, software, facilities and more. 
(Rowe 2019) describes additional considerations for readiness, to include: 
• Communications: Platforms need to coordinate plans with superiors and 
among each other.  
• Weapons: Adequate weapons must be available to achieve mission goals.  
• Navigation: Ships and their important systems must be usable.  
• Avionics: Aircraft and their important systems must be usable.  
• Radar: Platforms need functioning radar to anticipate threats.  
10 
• Electronic warfare: Platforms need defensive capabilities, and possibly 
offensive capabilities depending on the platform. 
• Information warfare: Platforms need defensive capabilities. (Rowe 2019) 
Given the consistent variability that is presented by ever-changing inputs, there 
exists a need to apply theories of readiness for combat in real-time. Betts (1995) makes a 
critical distinction in types of readiness, which is that of actual capability versus potential 
capability.  
Potential capability is best described as an “as designed” capability. Under 
projected circumstances, in expected scenarios, under predictable conditions, the system 
will be able to deliver a capability. A pure assessment of “potential capability” in this sense, 
serves little practical purpose when commencing a mission, and actual capability is the far 
better metric of preparedness. “Actual capability” is an assessment of current inputs and 
variables, including constraints on the system design, constraints on system condition, or 
constraints on the system’s environment.  
Moreover, the point at which the readiness assessment of equipment must take 
place is immediately preceding mission start, not in a projected future state, as potential 
capability insinuates.  
Rowe (2019) builds on the work by Betts (2005) to define these actual versus 
potential assessments as, in the former instance, “general” or “strategic” readiness and in 
the latter, “mission specific” or “tactical” readiness (2019).  
C. NAVAL MISSION PLANNING, MISSION ANALYSIS, AND MISSION-
ESSENTIAL TASKS 
The Navy has adopted regimented and robust planning processes and procedures 
that are codified within the Navy Warfare Publication 5–01 (Department of the Navy 
2013). 
This publication documents high-level steps and focuses on key inputs, processes, 
and outputs in the planning of missions that are adaptable to any echelon of command. The 
key tenets fall into six broad categories: 1) mission analysis, 2) course of action 
development, 3) course of action analysis (wargaming), 4) course of action comparison 
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and decision, 5) plan or order development, and 6) transition.  Without an accurate survey 
of capability and readiness of existing forces, establishment of an achievable mission 
becomes either more difficult, or based on faulty assumption. 
Mission analysis serves as the first assessment of the scenario and includes inputs, 
processes, and outputs designed to establish the first take on the mission at hand. This paper 
dedicates its time and effort on analyzing this operational planning step.  
Sample inputs to mission analysis would include intelligence products, planning 
guidance, and staff estimates. From these inputs, planners execute processes that define 
tasks and purpose of the mission, limitations and constraints on the mission, forces and 
assets available, available support assets, gaps of knowledge, and risks. This analysis feeds 
mission statements, commander’s intent and guidance, warning orders, and staff estimates. 
This process is reflected in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Mission Analysis Stage of Mission Planning.  
Source: Department of the Navy (2013). 
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It is in the mission analysis domain where the quality and quantity of inputs can be 
both critical and cumbersome. During mission analysis, defining specified, implied, and 
essential tasks are vital to the clarification of mission and to understand what assets are 
required (Department of the Navy 2013).  Specified tasks are assigned to a specific unit by 
a commanding organization, implied tasks are not stated but are assumed to be required to 
complete a mission, and mission-essential tasks are deemed vital to achieving success. 
Missions themselves are defined by numerous discrete tasks of all types, and most 
often they can originate from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 
3500.04, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL serves as a “hierarchical listing 
of the tasks that can be performed by a joint military force” (Kross 1995).  By listing these 
tasks, planners can integrate strategic, operational, and tactical taskings in a methodical 
way. Naval tasks typically fall at the operational and tactical level and are defined in the 
subset of the UJTL, the Navy Mission Essential Task List (NMETL).  
NMETLs provide “a comprehensive command and mission-specific list of Navy 
Mission-Essential Tasks (NMETs)” that “allow a commander to quantify the level and 
scope of effort required to achieve mission objectives” (Brown 2012). Understanding and 
mapping mission scenarios allows commanders to identify force capability, but these can 
serve more than one purpose, including that of taking system-produced data and assessing 
readiness for combat. The relationship of tasks is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. The Relationship between Task Lists and Mission Analysis 
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For a naval combat system. these essential tasks, which are deemed most critical to 
mission success, form a foundation upon which adaptive mission analysis can rest. 
D. NAVAL STRATEGIC MISSION READINESS: THE DEFENSE 
READINESS REVIEW SYSTEM 
Once essential tasks have been defined, the next step of mission planning is that of 
surveying the availability of forces and assets able to conduct the mission. In this domain, 
a need for adaptability also resides.  
 At senior decision levels, the Navy has implemented the Defense Readiness 
Reporting System – Navy  (DRRS-N), which “retains the ability to inform senior 
leadership of a unit’s ability to fight and win in major combat operations…DRRS-N 
permits the examination of specific mission-essential tasks (METs) within a unit’s mission-
essential task list (METL) to identify units that have attained the appropriate level of 
readiness to perform a required specialized mission” (Baker 2012).   
A sample dashboard of strategic tasking represented in DRSS-N is reflected in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. An Illustrative Dashboard of the Defense Readiness 
Review System.  Source: Trunkey (2013). 
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While DRRS-N serves its purpose as a high-level readiness reporting system, its 
focus lies in the larger assessment of personnel, equipment, supply, training, ordnance, 
networks, and infrastructure, or PESTONI (Zvijac 2017). Real-time adaptive feedback 
does not feed seamlessly into the DRRS-N reporting system, so critical inputs associated 
with combat system readiness may be outdated or possibly misinterpreted, as variable 
functional capability thresholds have not been defined, assessed, or accounted for. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has identified other issues with DRRS, 
including: 
• limited standardization across services because missions are defined 
differently 
• mission assessments are subjective 
• “DRRS has no way to distinguish between assigned missions, potential 
missions, hypothetical missions, and missions for which a unit has 
received no formal training” (Trunkey 2013)  
The absence of real-time feedback, combined with the noted deficiencies in 
standardization and of subjective input, result in a readiness status system that is not being 
optimally employed, and does not assess “mission specific” readiness (Rowe 2019).  
Alternatively, an employment of real-time assessment within DRRS-N would more clearly 
articulate the status of readiness of naval forces and allow for higher order analysis of both 
actual and potential system capability.  
E. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY AND PROBABILITY OF 
SUCCESSFUL MISSION 
1. Operational Availability (Ao) 
For the purposes of readiness for combat, the overarching metric of preference 
within the Department of Navy remains Ao. Indeed, as part of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System, new Capabilities Development Documents establish 
Ao as a Key Performance Parameter in almost all new systems (Ierardi 2018).  
At lower levels, the Navy introduced elements of data aggregation and 
manipulation for calculation of Ao over the past two decades by utilizing the Material 
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Readiness Database (MRDB). While useful, the system has limitations borne by the fact 
that the database does not intake and configuration manage detailed baselined information 
from the system design phase, is limited in its connectivity with many Program Executive 
Offices, and does not take direct, real-time inputs from fielded assets in theater (Clarke 
2018). 
Operational Availability, though, tells a partial story, given the fact that even a 
system not even in theater is still “available.”  In a contested, high OPTEMPO 
environment, an aggregated fleet level assessment of Ao combining all potential 
environments is not always actionable information.  Naval assets must be able to adapt to 
unique environments and understand own-ship availability as it relates to these 
environments.  
2. Probability of Successful Mission (Psm) 
An improved metric, then, is “Probability of Successful Mission,” or Psm, which 
can be used as a variable metric based on the mission performed and based upon equipment 
condition of the unit preparing to perform it.  
For example, a redundant string of servers with pooled resources utilized to process 
and compute sensor information could be assessed prior to commencing an air defense 
mission. If there is a failed node, there may be no functional effect on the mission itself, 
but the state of the probability of successful mission has degraded simply for the fact that 
should another node fail, the system would lose some level of functionality.  
The system is “available” at the start of the mission, but in a riskier state than if all 
redundancy was restored. Under well-planned circumstances, functionality can be 
degraded intentionally based on necessity, utilization of resources, or any number of other 
items to mitigate impacts. In less carefully planned systems, it might mean that overall 
system stability would suffer or crash.  
At its basest form, Psm = e-λt, a form of exponential decay, and reflects the 
probability that a system experiences no failures during a specified time interval t 
(Reliability Education 2007). During the design phase of a program, the time t would be 
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attributable to a period of time defined in the Design Reference Mission, under various 
scenarios and conditions.  
A design reference mission “defines the specific projected threat and operating 
environment baseline for a given force element, which may range from a single-purpose 
weapon system to a multi-mission platform to a multi-system, multi-platform system of 
systems” (Lilly and Russell 2003), While it serves as a baseline for acquisition phase 
vendor performance by defining how the vendor will be measured, and against what 
criteria, it does not account for the wide variations in system utilization, in operating 
environment, or in mission length. 
3. Complexity of Psm 
Upon reviewing UJTL and associated service sub-documents, the number and 
scope of mission sets that a DoD platform can ultimately execute is immense, and the 
probability of success does not ultimately break down neatly into a singular mission length. 
As systems transition from acquisition design phases into sustainment phases, the DRM 
would give way to discretely modeled mission scenarios that could be aggregated and 
simulated to improve upon a preliminary analysis of the DRM. 
For example, in a defensive scenario, a ship may track the probability of an anti-
ship cruise missile detection, probability of successful hard kill of an inter-continental 
ballistic missile, or probability of successful track and recovery of aircraft.  
In these scenarios, the Psm function serves as the point of entry for analysis but 
serves little practical purpose in a contested environment under increased operating tempo 
(OPTEMPO). When operating in the contested environments, system downtime for 
maintenance is not welcomed, and information gathering, aggregation, and dissemination 
is paramount. Psm assumes a finite period and a fully functioning system at the start of a 
mission.  Thus, Psm requires the ability to accommodate variability according to mission. 
F. MISSION ENGINEERING AND MISSION THREADS 
The concepts behind mission engineering continue to be resolved and defined, but 
it has been discussed as “a life cycle based, integrative approach to develop and implement 
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capabilities and functions from stakeholder needs into executable missions while balancing 
performance, risk, cost, and schedule” (Beam 2015).  The foundational aspects of mission 
engineering are critical to the adaptive assessment of readiness. An important task to 
perform when looking to assess current states of readiness is to fully decompose and 
understand the mission as it is expected to be performed.  
Under these circumstances, a more granular approach that incorporates the tenets 
of mission planning, blended with capability assessment of systems, the current status of 
systems, and external environmental factors, creates a holistic picture against which Psm 
can be assessed. These can frequently be articulated by the concept of a mission thread. 
1. Mission Threads and Combat Systems 
Gagliardi, Wood, and Morrow (2013) define an operational mission thread as “how 
the system of systems nodes (and perhaps the systems within the nodes) react to an 
operational stimulus. It is given as an end-to-end sequence of steps (external events, 
operator activities, and automated activities) that take place over a time period.” Defining 
a mission thread can follow a conceptual process such as Figure 6. In this process, both 
new and existing system attributes and functions are integrated with expert system inputs. 
 
Figure 6. Conceptual Development Process of Mission 
Thread. Source: Gagliardi, Wood, and Morrow (2013). 
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Utilizing the framework from Gagliardi, Wood, and Morrow, developing a combat 
system mission thread means developing the mission architecture, understanding what 
systems are drivers of capability, and building out the mission narrative and steps in a 
resource flow diagram, ultimately iterating this thread until there are agreed-upon scenarios 
and definitions of success. 
2. Detect to Engage and Combat System Readiness 
Integrated combat systems themselves are largely computing infrastructure and 
associated system of systems integration efforts. The term system of systems is used to 
describe an “integrated force package of interoperable systems acting as a single system to 
achieve a mission capability” (Murphy, Sheehan, Richardson 2013).     
These integrated systems follow a beginning to end process of target detection 
through engagement, which includes target identification, tracking, illumination, guidance, 
and eventual engagement and kill assessment (Integrated Publishing 2018), often referred 
to as a “kill chain.”   The number of systems required to execute any specific mission is 
robust and sometimes variable depending on the threat, on system functionality, and on 
system availability. The detect to engage process is one driven largely as the successful 
generation of information and integration/aggregation of this information into a series of 
commands and decisions. 
In focusing on the operational mission thread for a combat system, one would 
define the systems, tasks, external inputs, and activities needed to detect a threat and 
ultimately engage and assess that a target has been eliminated. The detect to engage 
sequence is also described as a sequence known as Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and 
Assess. An example of a kill chain is provided in Figure 7, which depicts a multi-layered 
capability designed to eliminate a specific threat or threats.  
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Figure 7. The Kill Chain and Readiness. Adapted from Brown (2012). 
In this example, there are layers of complexity that are greatly reduced to 
“red/yellow/green.”  Better mission and performance level analysis and probabilities of 
success would drive more information, and mission-specific information, into the mission 
planning process.  
G. REMOTE READINESS MONITORING 
In day to day operation, individuals rely on consumer products (e.g., automobiles, 
computers) that already utilize enhanced diagnostics to monitor product health and 
optimize performance  (Janasak and Beshears 2007). 
Newly developed naval systems have been designed to have robust fault detection 
and isolation, though they have not kept pace with consumer technology in relating the 
impact of complex system failure and then identifying and capitalizing upon the knowledge 
of the internal and external indicators that led to failure. 
A naval combat system fundamentally acts as its own edge computing equipment, 
bounded by domains and linked centrally on shipboard networks. As laid out by Hassan, 
et al. (2018), edge computing operates as an aggregator and analyzer of information within 
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an “Internet of Things” ecosystem. An example of a high-level cloud and edge-based 
computing solution can be seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Cloud, Edge, and Sensor Computing Reference. 
Adapted from Open Automation Software (2019). 
While consumer IoT and edge computing ecosystems revolve around smart hubs, 
telephones, tablets, appliances, and commercial analytical tools, naval edge computing 
revolves around combat systems and their constituent systems and subsystems. 
The “smartness” of combat system sensors, controllers, and edge computing 
equipment is variable, given the gap in time of initial development among different 
hardware systems and combat system software baselines. Newer naval systems, such as 
the Joint Strike Fighter (Powrie and Novis 2006), hold more robust self-reporting 
capability, but even older systems such as the SPY-1 radar have developed “bolt-on” 
solutions that can diagnose and detect some level of system health (PR Newswire 2002). 
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These systems and subsystems provide individual reporting, but combat system-level 
analysis is sub-optimized to report capability.  
The next actionable phase of data access and aggregation in an IoT environment is 
putting it to action within a Product Life-cycle Management (PLM) tool, defined as an data 
environment that enables a “strategic business approach that applies a consistent set of 
business solutions that support the collaborative creation, management, dissemination, and 
use of product definition information” (CIMdata 2019). 
H. SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS AND BUILT-IN TEST 
Within a PLM environment lives the configuration and information about systems 
being analyzed.  Naval combat systems are often designed and developed with a few key 
design aid documents that fall into the concept of supportability analysis. Examples of 
these products would include reliability block diagrams (RBD), fault tree analysis, Failure 
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), reliability estimates, maintenance task 
analysis, and level of repair analysis (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). Each one of these 
products contributes to the overall “Operational Availability” (Ao) equation, most 
commonly interpreted as a decomposition of “the system’s reliability (mean time between 
failure (MTBF)), maintainability (meantime to repair (MTTR)), and supportability (mean 
logistics delay time (MLDT))” (Naval Sea Systems Command n.d.). Just as these 
parameters can be utilized to calculate Ao, they can be used to calculate Psm. 
As complex systems are becoming more and more reliant on built-in test, ease of 
maintainability drives efficiency in system utilization. The faster failures can be resolved, 
the less time systems are down for maintenance and by extension, the more time they are 
available for use. However, this BIT capability is not purely for maintenance. Fault 
detection and fault isolation techniques continue to advance (Yin, Ye, and Chen 2013) to 
the point that detailed mapping of design phase deliverables such as the FMECA can link 
individual failure modes to detailed, automated test procedures.  These test procedures 
provide an ever-changing, and variable snapshot of system performance that is predicated 
on several key inputs, including unique line replaceable unit runtime, line replaceable unit 
redundancy, environmental indicators, duty cycle, and software reliability.  By having 
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these test procedures in place, faults in systems are known at any given point, affording the 
ability to adaptively analyze the impact of failure on a mission based on additional 
parameters. 
1. Unique Line Replaceable Unit Run Time 
Time is a critical component to understanding the probability of failure in any 
component or system in most probability distributions. The longer an item has been 
operating, the more exposure to potential failure modes, and therefore, the higher the 
likelihood of failure. Individual LRU run time is a key building block that is critical for the 
execution of the concept of “Remaining Useful Life” (RUL).  RUL remains a standard of 
prognosis and health monitoring and can be simply defined as a “prediction on the time 
remaining before a machine part is likely to require repair or replacement.” (Barrett 2019). 
By individually tracking line replaceable unit (LRU) run times, the variability in 
system health can be captured and assessed, as well as applied against a baseline 
determination of performance, which is that of “as designed performance.” 
2. Line Replaceable Unit or System Redundancy 
The physical and functional characteristics of systems can be captured by both 
Functional Block Diagrams and Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD). Reliability block 
diagrams serve as a visual representation of components and by extension the functional 
characteristics of those components, and are a method used to analyze systems and assess 
their reliability (Cepin 2011). When viewing an RBD, such as in Figure 9 below, one can 




Figure 9. Reliability Block Diagram for Redundant 
Components. Source: Cepin (2011). 
3. Environmental Indicators 
Integrated Combat systems are composed of large amounts of electronic 
components, which degrade and fail based on a few critical factors such as humidity, 
temperature, or vibration (Souza et al. 2014). 
Various elements of the physical environment serve a critical role in the behavior 
of systems, subsystems, LRUs, and components. An overly humid environment can create 
a situation that drives electronic component failure at a more frequent rate than a drier 
environment. An environment with elevated levels of vibration can create problems in both 
electronic and mechanical components. 
A system-level assessment would need to understand the effects of these 
environmental indicators and apply a weighting or factoring that is compiled with time  to 
assess impact to mission performance. 
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4. Duty Cycle 
System operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and stress is a critical, an under-represented 
input to the system of systems failure scenario. When systems (and systems of systems) 
are under development, the outcomes are largely governed by inputs and controls defined 
in the Design Reference Mission. The analysis breaks down under stressing, realistic 
scenarios, where increased OPTEMPO pushes systems beyond the design intent.  An 
assessment of readiness must include the potential to operate outside of design parameters. 
5. Software Reliability  
Combat systems are complex and characterized by thousands of interfaces and 
messages traveling in concert to execute a given mission. Individual systems, such as 
sensors, require signal processing and computing capacity in order to translate analog 
inputs to digital and ultimately detect hostile threats. The millions of lines of code that are 
required to execute the scope of missions within a major naval combat system inevitably 
lead to software defects that degrade capability. An understanding of software architecture 
and failure propagation must be considered when seeking to analyze the mission of a 
combat system. 
6. Use of FMECA in Supportability Analysis 
In a singular system, thresholds of performance such as up, down, or degraded are 
set during design using supportability analysis. These parameters are only revised if careful 
attention is paid and managed through rigorous configuration control and data 
management/linkage.  
An example use case would be to consider an obsolete Transmit/Receive module 
in an active phased array radar that required a redesign to accommodate new components. 
This redesign undoubtedly results in impacts on the way the transmit/receive module 
behaves within the system, including lower or higher reliability, availability, and 
maintainability.  
This change requires an adjustment to the definition of “failure” within system 
built-in test software since new failure modes may have introduced, older failure modes 
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may have been eliminated, or the same failure modes exist but are more or less frequent. 
The Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis is defined as “a design technique that 
can be applied to identify and investigate potential system (product or process) weaknesses 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). Depending on the program, these analyses take place 
iteratively from the preliminary design phase through the critical design phase. If 
approached from a life cycle perspective, the FMECA should live with the system and be 
revised until system disposal.   In all circumstances, the changes to this supportability 
analysis impact the ability to perform mission essential tasks. 
Applications of the FMECA then must be expanded. In development, failure modes 
must tie not to system functional performance, but to overall mission performance. A 
simplified example can be seen in Table 1, which looks at the Air Warfare (AW), Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), and mobility mission areas. 
Table 1. Failure Modes and Capability Impact to Mission Area 
 
 
Understanding distributions of failure and impacts across a system or system of 
systems, then allows for “up, down, and degraded” estimates to apply to warfare area 
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readiness. As such, the failure in the AW example above in Table 1 may result in mission 
termination, whereas the same failure in the ASW mission area may mean the mission 
continues. These instances would be captured in the mission threads and scenario 
development. These mission threads, the FMECA, and the system built-in test are 
inextricably linked, and all are a vital reason they must live within a PLM system.  
I. THE DEFINITION OF NEED: ADAPTIVE READINESS ASSESSMENT 
IN DEPLOYED ASSETS 
It has been established that requirements in combat systems do not incorporate a 
cohesive readiness assessment tool that is based on the mission performed. Existing tools 
are an amalgamation of reliability centered maintenance (RCM), fault detection and 
isolation, and are gradually incorporating some aspects of Prognostics and Health 
Monitoring (PHM) (Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc. 2001). 
Concepts of RCM focus on allowing equipment to operate under normal 
environment and normal load until failure occurs or a sensor system determines 
maintenance is necessary (Pritchett 2018). Fault Detection and Isolation encompasses a 
broad range of practice, but when comparing to the prescriptive capabilities of PHM, serves 
as a reactive analysis of the determination of failure in a component or system. More 
frequently, all of these practices include the utilization of sensors and software to run tests 
and search for prescribed value sets that correspond to “functional” or “not functional.”  
PHM techniques are a combination of both expert system knowledge and data-driven 
techniques. 
To get the next level of detail, though, a coordinated effort from each individual 
element of a combat system (i.e., sensors, target localization systems, tracking systems, 
engagement systems) needs to be developed to form a common “baseline.”  Naval combat 
systems need a capability to decompose and functionally allocate missions to systems, and 
these systems need to incorporate built-in test, supportability analysis, and mission threads 
into simulated scenarios that provide a probability of successful mission. 
Moreover, an off-ship architecture that combines both existing and new capability 
can eventually transform strike groups into data ecosystems that feed each other, each one 
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providing continuous feedback for algorithm improvement. Machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, combined with robust fault detection software design in new systems, now 
offers an ability to assess system health based on equipment condition and to perform risk 
assessment at the mission/functional level.  
The core problem of the end to end “mission to data” linkage problem lies in 
defining ownership of information nodes, freeing the paths of information flow between 
those nodes, methodically incorporating gradually improving data, and then translating 
data into action – this problem is both a technical and managerial one. There is a 
requirement to bridge the operational picture with the acquisition of systems in order to 
assess readiness. 
J. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
In a naval ship’s combat system control center, there are multiple shipboard 
stakeholders that are all accessing information from warfare areas and combining both 
internal and external data sets. 
Each ship then reports back to the Type Commander (e.g., Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces, Pacific/Atlantic), who reports to either U.S. Fleet Forces Command or 
Commander, Pacific Fleet, whose motives are driven even larger strategic decision 
processes. 
The Navy then has various other stakeholders, such as the Naval Supply Systems 
Command, and its various contracted depots and maintenance centers. 
In the acquisition chain of command, there are system engineers, functional leads, 
program managers, resource sponsors, original equipment manufacturers, and combat 
system integrators.  
Each stakeholder has a varying level of interest in understanding the readiness of 
systems in the fleet, but all maintain a vested interest in inserting processes and architecture 
that supports continued evolution of readiness reporting both shipboard and ashore. A high-
level stakeholder analysis shows these interests in Table 2. 
28 
Table 2. Stakeholder Analysis 
Stakeholder Desires 
User -Know the current state of Combat System 
readiness 
-Know the probability that, through 
simulation, the current combat system can 
meet mission 
Fleet Commanders -Fleet level knowledge of system readiness 
for specific mission sets 
-Knowledge of better capable options within 
the area of responsibility 
-Joint level information to fill gaps for 
degraded capability 
-More comprehensive tactical picture 
Supply System -Information on known failures (demand) 
-Information on possible future failures 
(potential demand) 
-Location of failed components (inventory 
optimization) 
Combat System Engineering Activity -Drive integrated monitoring capability that 
results in a “must-have” for the combat 
system 
-Seamless information exchange among 
elements 
OEM -Know the performance of own systems 
-Know how internal and external factors 
affect performance 
Warfare Center -Pull together analysis from all stakeholders 
into meaningful Common Operational Picture 
-Assist with the push of real-time 
feedback/assistance 
Combat System Program Managers -Simplify interfaces among Combat System 
elements 
-Maximize performance within existing 
design constraints 
-Know that the combat system can meet the 
intended mission 
Element Program Managers 
 
-Know system meets Ao Key Performance 
Parameter 
-Know when the system is failed and that 




The resulting conceptual system from the need statement and stakeholder analysis 
results in four systems, the ship-based Mission-based Operational Effectiveness Tool 
(MBOET), the spaced-based Satellite Data Transmission System (SDTS), and the cloud-
based Shore-based Data Storage and Access System (SDSAS) and Product Lifecycle 
Management System (PLMS), that come together in the contextual diagram represented in 
Figure 10. 
 











III. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) define the operational requirements analysis 
process as a set of discrete tasks: 
• Mission Definition, which is the prime or alternate missions of the system. 
• Performance and physical parameters, or the operating characteristics and 
functions of the system. 
• Operational deployment, or the quantity of equipment and resources in the 
expected operating environment. 
• Operational life cycle, or the projected time the system will be in use. 
• Utilization requirements, or how the system will be used by the various 
stakeholders. 
• Effectiveness factors, or requirements tied to reliability, maintainability, 
personnel skill and efficiency. 
• Environmental factors, or the environment in which the system is 
supposed to operate. 
• Interoperability requirements are also included, and for the proposed 
system of systems to perform adaptive readiness assessment, these will be 
important. 
As earlier defined, the ship and shore concept for the need statement involves four 
primary systems and their associated sub-systems: 
1. The Mission-based Operational Assessment Tool (MBOET) 
2. Satellite Data Transmission System (SDTS) 
3. Shore-based Data Storage and Access System (SDSAS) 
4. Product Life cycle Management System (PLMS) 
Requirements defined in this section are deemed to be at the system level, to be 
decomposed across associated subsystems as required during a future state. 
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A. MISSION DEFINITION 
In order to simplify the problem, this document generalizes a single mission warfare 
scenario. The system of systems demonstrates the process of pre-mission analysis and 
simulation designed to assess the probability of mission success over a defined time period 
for a discrete mission set. Next, the system of systems will transfer, analyze, and re-
baseline the combat system software for continually improved fidelity of predictions of 
success.  
There are varying ways in which the previously defined stakeholders provide inputs 
to the MBOET to receive output data used for similar or entirely different purposes. This 
relationship is reflected in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Inputs and Output to and from the MBOET 
B. PERFORMANCE AND PHYSICAL PARAMETERS 
The conceptual shipboard system will be incorporated into future software 
baselines and designed to interface with both operational and acquisition phase data, to 
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include failure modes, failure effects, failure reporting, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, and fault identification information. The system will be able to capture 
system health information and transmit via SDTS to a shore-based location (SDSAS) for 
further analysis. The shore-based aggregating site will provide a product life cycle 
management environment (PLMS), with brokered access to all government and private 
entities that perform design, development, test, evaluation, and sustainment on individual 
systems and combat systems. The system will have the ability to redistribute software 
baseline updates to all systems on shore and at sea. 
The shipboard system (the MBOET) is responsible for mission analysis, data 
ingestion, and simulation. It is limited by the overall latency of the combat system itself, 
as well as by physical space, weight, power, and cooling requirements. 
Satellite and shore-based systems (SDTS, SDSAS, and PLMS) are responsible for 
data transfer, aggregation, brokerage, manipulation, and re-distribution. 
1. Shipboard Systems 
1. The MBOET and shall aggregate internal, external, OPTEMPO, duty, 
environmental and personnel indicators, including: 
• Component humidity, component vibration, and component temperature, 
where these indicators are known to contribute to the degradation of 
performance or indicate failure or potential failure 
• Duty cycle for critical mission systems as defined in the FMECA 
• Failure modes (via Fault Detection) 
• LRU run time 
• LRU redundancy (RBDs)  
• Functional Block Diagram 
• Application of software reliability  
2. The MBOET shall be able to adaptively apply mission boundaries, 
allocated performance, and scenarios. 
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3. The MBOET shall apply weightings for contributing mission systems 
according to defined mission threads and mission reliability block 
diagrams 
4. The MBOET shall assess missions based on mission threads that are 
defined and refined throughout the development and sustainment phases 
of the program. 
5. The MBOET shall be able to simulate at least XX number of mission 
simulations within XX timeframe. 
6. The MBOET shall include failure simulation, environmental parameter 
impact, and human error impact. 
7. The MBOET shall fit within a XX space, XX weight, XX power, and XX 
cooling envelope. 
8. The MBOET shall be able to interpret fault identification codes from all 
elements of the combat system. 
2. Satellite and Shore-Based Systems 
1. The SDTS system shall be able to transfer up to XX megabytes in any 
given 24-hour period. 
2. The SDTS system shall be able to transfer both classified and unclassified 
data. 
3. The SDSAS shall be able to store XX petabytes of data. 
4. The SDSAS shall provide visualization tools and allow users to assess 
shipboard baseline deviations for more detailed analysis. 
5. The SDSAS shall provide brokered access for XX number of government 
and contractor users to be able to access information as controlled by the 
government. 
6. The PLMS shall store all unique logistics product data that exists for 
systems, subsystems, line replaceable units, and components, to include: 
• FMECA 
• reliability block diagrams 
• mission threads 
• part numbering and nomenclature 
• reliability data 
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• maintainability data 
• supply data 
• part run time and repair history 
• part cost for repair 
• part cost for replacement 
7. The PLMS shall link directly to the combat system software baseline and 
automatically populate software with revisions of suitability metrics upon 
change. 
C. OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT 
Shipboard systems will be deployed as part of combat system baselines and 
developed under managed, new baseline development efforts. Shore-based systems will be 
deployed in a manner that facilitates growth in data transfer and storage. PLM systems will 
be deployed as part of a coordinated effort to align all combat system life cycle 
management under a singular tool. 
1. Shipboard Systems 
1. The MBOET shall be deployed with a new Baseline update of a combat 
system. 
2. MBOET shall interface will all shipboard systems that are allocated to the 
detect to engage sequence as defined by NMETLs for all platform warfare 
areas. 
2. Satellite and Shore-Based Systems 
1. The SDSAS shall be deployed within the continental United States. 
2. The PLMS shall be deployed within the continental United States. 
D. OPERATIONAL LIFE CYCLE 
The shipboard system shall be composed of both software and interfaces and shall 
be managed centrally and updated as configurations of combat system and combat system 
element hardware and software is updated over its life cycle.  
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Shore-based infrastructure shall be in operation for the duration of the combat 
system program. As combat system software baselines are retired, the shipboard and shore-
based systems will cease support. 
1. Shipboard Systems 
1. The MBOET shall be configuration managed by a singular combat system 
engineering activity.  
2. The combat system readiness system shall be updated over its life cycle to 
accommodate new systems, subsystems, and LRUs as well as new 
missions and data sets. 
2. Satellite and Shore-Based Systems 
1. The SDTS shall have an operational life cycle of XX years, or until 
replaced. 
2. The SDSAS shall have an operational life cycle of XX years, or until 
replaced. 
3. The SDSAS shall have the ability to transfer proposed updates to 
suitability metrics to the PLM database for review. 
4. The PLMS shall have an operational life cycle of XX years, or until 
replaced. 
5. The PLMS shall be managed jointly by a government activity and a 
combat system engineering activity. 
6. The PLMS shall be able to store information up to and including Secret 
classification. 
E. UTILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
Knowledge of the state of readiness is a capability that has asymmetric utilization 
requirements but is always required. Shipboard capability retains a higher priority, as it is 
the first support tool that deployed assets will utilize to assess preparedness for a mission. 
1. Shipboard Systems  
1. The MBOET shall be in operation prior to the execution of any combat 
system mission. 
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2. The MBOET shall be able to operate during the execution of the mission 
and reflect revisions of the probability of operational success based on 
combat system element system input. 
3. The MBOET shall include projections beyond initially defined mission 
scenarios. 
4. The MBOET shall be available at all times the combat system is available 
for tasking. 
2. Satellite and Shore-Based Systems 
1. The SDTS shall be able to handle XX transmissions per day. 
2. The SDTS shall be able to transfer XX megabytes of data per day. 
3. The SDTS shall be able to transfer data at a speed of XX 
megabytes/second. 
4. The SDSAS shall be able to broker and manage user access.  
5. The SDSAS shall hold information up to and including the Secret level of 
classification. 
6. The PLMS shall be able to manage up to XX users. 
7. The PLMS shall store baselined combat system mission threads.  
F. EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS 
The MBOET system is to be measured against its own predictions in order to 
improve the overall efficiency and accuracy of the projected probability of success of a 
mission. As such, any time a system projects success above XX% and a mission 
terminating failure occurs, the overall readiness projection system will have been deemed 
to have “failed.”   
1. Shipboard Systems 
1. The MBOET shall have an availability of XX%. 
2. The MBOET shall have a Mean Time Between Software Critical Failure 
of XX hours. 
3. The MBOET shall have a Mean Simulations Between Failure of XX 
simulations. 
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4. The MBOET shall maintain an XX% accuracy rate, graduating to a XX% 
accuracy rate over a period of XX years. 
2. Satellite and Shore-Based Systems 
1. The SDTS shall have an availability of XX%. 
2. The SDSAS shall have an availability of XX%. 
3. The PLMS shall have an availability of XX%. 
G. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The shipboard and shore-based systems are to be designed to operate in their 
respective environment, with the shipboard systems assumed to be kept below deck with 
the rest of combat system processing equipment. 
1. Shipboard Systems 
1. The MBOET will operate within a XX environment. 
2. Satellite and Shore-Based Systems 
1. The SDTS system will operate in a XX environment. 
2. The SDSAS will operate in a XX environment. 
3. The PLMS will operate in a XX environment. 
H. INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
After aggregating the varied inputs, the MBOET must apply a framework by which 
the inputs can be ingested and transformed into a probability of successful mission 
calculation. Moreover, the Psm may be decomposed further into lower-level probabilities 
of success, such as the probability of successful hard kill or probability of successful soft 
kill. These are not discussed in this paper. 
1. All systems shall be able to interoperate. 
2. All systems shall use a publish/subscribe data model for sharing of data. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) define the Advanced System planning process as 
one tied to linking the definition of need to an overarching architecture and plan. Leading 
up to the process outlined in this study, feasibility analysis, support analysis, and design 
trades will have already been studied.  
Given the nature of the need statement for the capability to adaptively assess health, 
much of the effort is known to be feasible within existing combat system architecture or is 
commercially available, provided the correct input data is coordinated to enter the 
shipboard and shore-based systems. Thus, this capability need moves directly into the 
creation of a technical approach and application of functional analysis. 
A. TECHNICAL APPROACH TO SHIPBOARD READINESS ASSESSMENT 
The complex tactical environment for combat systems clearly aligns to the 
performers of NMETs. In doing so, integrated combat systems can use structured missions 
defined by “mission analysis” and “mission planning” phases of operational planning, 
using the NMETL to identify system boundaries and allocate systems and subsystems to 
mission-essential tasks.  System physical and functional data sets are then tied to mission 
and a common baseline is set. 
In reviewing NMETs associated with a warfare scenario, specific taskings are 
aligned to systems and subsystems the operate as part of an integrated system of systems. 
These systems perform discrete functions and have been designed to meet specific 
performance parameters, to include reliability, maintainability, and availability 
requirements under the constraints of a design reference mission.  
Combat systems are multi-mission, and warfare scenarios can be either more or less 
demanding depending on the threat set. For advanced threats or high intensity 
environments, a higher OPTEMPO will need to be considered as opposed to that used for 
the design reference mission. Thus, variable assessment of these mission scenarios is 
considered. 
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1. System Functional Allocation Example: Air Warfare Scenario 
As an example, a genericized hierarchy of systems organized by capability in the 
detect to engage sequence is seen in Figure 12. The primary sensor that serves surveillance, 
detection, localization, and tracking (NMETs) is a singular system, Sensor 1. Sensors 2 and 
3 serve as redundant or back-up systems. 
 
Figure 12. Hierarchy of System in the Detect to Engage Sequence 
For sensor 1 to meet each capability, a threshold of performance must be 
established under defined conditions and duration. As such, an adaptive readiness 
assessment would need to include all three capabilities (Surveillance and Detection, Target 
Localization, and Tracking) and each associated demand on the system from that 
capability. 
Where allocations for the system-level performance of Sensor 1’s reliability was a 
mean time between mission terminating failure of 500 hours under the stress of the design 
reference mission, it may become 275 hours based on the stress of the task at hand. The 
true demand and failure rates of the system rely on tracing sensor self-reporting through 
the rest of the conceptual architecture.  
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2. Scenario Development 
Once systems have been functionally allocated, the MBOET must build scenarios 
predicated on the tasking defined by the NMETLs associated with the warfare scenario, to 
include such tasks as those reflected in Attachment 1, the CG required operational 
capabilities and projected operating environment for a notional air warfare tasking (Fanta 
2014).  
The MBOET builds mission scenarios and associated OPTEMPO profiles 
necessary to meet these NMETLs, initially reflecting multiple pre-generated scenarios. The 
MBOET must then update scenarios dynamically over time based on actual mission 
execution data and system tasking and health data. An example of a notional pre-generated 
scenario (similar to a design reference mission) is reflected in Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
 
Figure 13. Notional Surveillance and Detection System 






















Figure 14. Notional Engagement System Utilization in Air Warfare Scenario 
It is critical to recognize that for both the surveillance and detection and the 
engagement functional capabilities, the redundant systems in the kill chain (e.g., Sensor 2 
and Sensor 3) will have wholly different utilization profiles. 
As actual input variables are recorded over defined mission sets, the percentage 
utilization of the sensor will be tracked over time and aggregated for future machine 
learning and artificial intelligence application, ultimately resulting in a refined mission 
scenario simulation that best reflects a mission-based baseline scenario for an air warfare 
mission. 
3. Usage of Analysis 
By this point, each system, based on the task at hand and via expert analysis, has 
been assigned a threshold of performance that must be met in order to achieve success, 
which is defined as the successful execution of all mission essential tasks, in the projected 




















Air Warfare Scenario (Engagement System)
43 
Due to the complexity of potential naval mission sets, an iteratively improving 
process must be adopted in order to refine Psm calculations. In a base scenario, simulations 
of system-level performance may be run on the ship to verify the Psm under multiple threat 
sets and combined scenarios.  
Each threshold of functional failure varies depending on the mission, creating a 
unique scenario each time a simulation is run. This mission simulation would be populated 
with system thresholds and simulated with weighted external environmental indicators 
from sensors to determine the contribution to the probability of failure within the system.  
Next, the MBOET would combine these inputs with reliability block diagrams that 
would determine both the likelihood of multiple failures and the impact of the loss of 
redundancy. It may also be used to simulate beginning the mission without redundancy 
restored. 
4. Information and Interfaces 
As discussed, multiple indicators can be utilized to assess the impact on system 
performance during one of many scenarios. In the instance of a combat system, a Mission-
Based Operational Effectiveness tool would be developed with interfaces to various 
external systems that seamlessly provide information through common messaging traffic. 
As defined in the requirements, the MBOET is responsible for ingestion of material 
condition parameters including: 
• operating environmental conditions, to include temperature, humidity, and 
vibration  
• information on critical component faults as defined in the Failure Modes, 
Effects, and Criticality Report 
• current system condition at every level of indenture 
These parameters are merged with assessments of known design information, such 
as reliability block diagrams, FMECA, maintainability information, mission parameters, 
mission length, and current system condition to generate a probability of successful 
mission. 
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If a risk-based assessment has been conducted by the commanding officer and they 
deem the mission un-executable, relevant outputs from the MBOET could provide actions 
to take to improve the probability of success of the mission, to include: 
• targeted preventative maintenance 
• targeted corrective maintenance 
• a viable reduced OPTEMPO that heightens the probability of mission 
success 
• a viable reduction of mission length that increases the probability of 
mission success 
As the last resort, in the event that any of these MBOET assessments do not meet 
the established threshold of performance necessary to execute the mission over a defined 
period of time, as allocated by NMETs, a broader survey of forces should be conducted to 
identify other available naval assets. 








Figure 15. Mission Assessment by NMETL 
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V. ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
In consolidating a primary problem set that spans multiple program offices, 
companies, and other organizations, there are gaps that must be filled. In execution, the 
simple act of aligning one of the four proposed systems in the conceptual architecture is a 
challenging array of software development and interfacing. 
A. BRIDGING THE SHIP AND SHORE IN A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
To successfully streamline data management, the shipboard combat system 
architecture must merge with that of the shore-based. A high-level event trace diagram as 
seen below helps visualize how the transition of data from ship to shore comes together. 
As seen in Figure 16, the four major systems combine to provide a flow of information that 
is aggregated from the ship, disseminated to shore, updated in a product life cycle 
management tool and in the combat system software baseline, and re-constituted as a 
revised fleet-level software update. 
 
Figure 16. Event Trace of Information Flow in System of Systems 
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B. CLOUD-BASED READINESS AND FLEET ASSESSMENT 
From the cloud, higher-order analysis can be performed in a centralized and 
coherent manner. Fragmented acquisition and implementation efforts can constrain the 
conceptual framework, so maintaining ownership under a singular sponsor and owner aids 
in execution. In this case, the owner is the government program office that maintains 
oversight of the combat system engineering activity (CSEA).    
Each ship, in its own configuration, provides unique insights, managed in the cloud-
based product life cycle management tool. Individual ships maintain their own 
characteristics and configurations, but once data is aggregated, fleet-level analysis may 
influence how software baselines carry thresholds of readiness in the future. The 
aggregation process is seen in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17. Multiple Ships Aggregating Information Ashore. 
Adapted from Flickr (2010) and Silver Bullet, Inc. (2005). 
Centralizing information covers one step. The second step is the one that blends 
data-driven decision processes and expert system decision processes. Jung, Niculita, and 
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Skaf (2018) laid out a framework for fault diagnosis that covers the complexity of combat 
systems and their constituent systems.  
In it, they define two primary methods of diagnosis, that being model-based or data-
driven, covering qualitative and quantitative factors. In complex systems, data-driven 
solutions are still predicated on proper test point definition, trend analysis, and structured 
or unstructured data analysis. Thus, a blended approach is desired, combining this data 
with expert system developer input and data in an Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop, as 
seen in Figure 18. 
  
Figure 18. The OODA Loop. Source: Feloni and Pelisson (2017).  
The OODA loop will be used to intake data-driven analysis (observe) and blend it 
with expert analysis (orient). The decision to update the software baseline is held by the 
government and combat system engineering activity, resulting in the final action 
(decide/act), that of pushing a new software update with updated scenarios and mission 
failure thresholds forward to deployed ships. 
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1. Refinement Process Decomposed 
Figure 19 represents a combat system that has successfully baselined algorithms 
during development. The basis for this process is developed from initial failure mode 
analysis, which is then traced to mission readiness, and modeled. Via common interface 
messaging across elements, the ICS pulls pertinent system health information for an 
adaptive assessment of readiness. 
 
Figure 19. Combat System Update and Ship Information Ready for Export 
By utilizing health message traffic and assessing divergence, the ICS can use fewer 
system resources and can utilize machine learning techniques to update shipboard 
algorithms within austere environments until a revised fleet baseline of performance can 
be delivered. 
Once the information has reached the server external to the integrated combat 
system, a policy and process flow occurs that requires close coordination of most of the 
stakeholders identified. 
The process decomposes into five major steps, all requiring strong process control. 
The steps include:  
1. Bulk Data Transfer  
2. Sustainment Engineering Review  
3. Element OEM Review 
4. Combat System Engineering Activity Review 
5. Software Baseline Update  
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a. Bulk Data Transfer via the SDTS 
BDT serves as a variable factor in the process, as the time and ability to execute 
rests in mission posture, resource allocation, time of day, and bandwidth capability. In 
practice, the process of transfer should take place during scheduled downtime, sending 
existing data in shipboard combat system servers back to the SDSAS. This data warehouse 
would provide a central repository for multiple user access across combat system element 
level original equipment manufacturers, the CSEA, and naval sustainment engineering 
activities. 
b. Sustaining Engineering Review 
The SER is a government activity review of all combat system element data sets. 
Its core purpose rests in being a central clearinghouse for sustainment modeling and for AI 
tool validation/verification. The output from this review are programmatic budgetary and 
readiness decisions. Participants in this review include element level subject matter experts 
(SME), combat system SMEs, and integrated combat system (ICS)/element program 
offices. This process is reflected in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Government Sustainment Engineering Review 
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c. Element OEM Review 
The EOR is an internal review from Design Agents of combat system elements (i.e., 
surveillance and detection system, tracking system, engagement system), and is meant to 
perform detailed analysis of failure modes, reliability metrics, fault identification, failure 
threshold refinement, element level functional performance assessment, and software 
update proposal for ICS integration. This includes a system and subsystem level analysis 
that assesses both data-driven recommendations from fielded systems and expert analysis 
for the incorporation of new improvement projects. The process is seen in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Element OEM Decision Analysis Process 
d. Combat System Engineering Activity Review 
The CSEA Review process is the central decisional process for synthesizing inputs 
from government and OEM experts. The CSEA develops and manages the baseline 
software code and is responsible for integrating variable inputs from external stakeholders 
and deriving a system of systems readiness assessment. Included in the CSEA scope are a 
probabilistic assessment of individual mission success across all integrated elements, 
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fusion of element level functional performance assessment, and aggregation of multi-
platform level data into a continuous refinement effort to reduce uncertainty in ICS 
readiness assessment.  This process is reflected in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. CSEA Synthesis and Assessment 
e. Software Updates and Re-delivery 
At regular intervals, data analysis groups convene to agree upon software 
configuration changes in alignment with the CSEA baseline deviation assessment. 
Algorithm updates would be pushed to all supported platforms and the cycle of data capture 




C. THE RESULTING OPERATIONAL PICTURE 
Figure 23 represents the final conceptual framework by which data-driven 
decisions are reviewed by design agents, combat system engineering activities, government 
experts, and by machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) tools, with the goal 
of facilitating and adjudicating the environment in which a threshold of functional failure 
is defined and articulated through the MBOET. Thus, a continual refinement process is 
implemented. 
  
Figure 23. The Operational Context of the OODA Loop. Adapted 
from Flickr (2010) and Silver Bullet, Inc. (2005). 
D. LIMITATIONS 
A primary limitation of this analysis is the allocation of requirements in the 
functional analysis. Thus, requirement ownership should be assessed and decomposed 
amongst areas of programmatic responsibility, as well as aligned to the realities of 
resources and schedules. A dedicated product roadmap should reflect capability 
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integration, roles, and responsibilities. An example of an integrated roadmap strategy that 
can be utilized is seen in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Sample IT Development Roadmap. Source: Acqnotes (2018). 
As the concept matures, continued analysis and studies must be performed in order 
to identify requirements that are both feasible and meet the overall intent of the program. 
Specific requirements, such as latency, bandwidth, size, weight, power, cooling, and 
storage must all be assessed to determine the correct balance of capability and cost. 
1. SDTS Considerations 
This system requires additional analysis to understand how existing product 
roadmaps may support broadened data reduction and transfer needs. As the next 
generations of satellite communications are brought to bear, some of the fundamental 
barriers to real-time streaming of data and associated edge and cloud-based assessment 
become less restrictive. Defining system allocation/needs will be critical to scoping the 
development efforts of future satellite communication systems. 
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2. SDSAS Considerations 
This system will require more study to understand both the quantity of information 
coming off sensors and edge equipment and the velocity at which that information is 
generated. Additionally, there are significant cybersecurity implications to housing the 
current status of readiness of all naval assets in a singular location. As this system matures, 
other conceptual solutions may be considered and/or utilized in the name of data integrity 
and security. 
3. PLMS Considerations 
The PLM system remains the heart of the configuration of the combat system 
software baseline as well as the configuration of mission analysis and threads. The revision 
of this data, which serves as the singular authoritative data source for all system suitability 
information will need to be integrated with both shipboard and shore-based architecture in 
order to facilitate streamlined data update and analysis.  
Additionally, building a digital representation of systems within this environment 
will provide the ability to simulate off the ship and refine software baselines more quickly 







As new naval combat system baselines are developed and delivered, a 
comprehensive, public/private integration effort must take shape to synthesize mission data 
sets and system analysis to achieve a desired end state of material and functional mission 
readiness assessment, both automatically and dynamically delivered.  
Thresholds of performance and mission scenarios are living pieces of data and 
expert assumptions within the integrated combat system, as areall pieces of sensor 
information that stream across the combat system local area network.  Changing these 
assumptions and inputs can vastly change the likelihood a system will be able to know if it 
can execute its mission. 
Through careful planning and data management, ship level edge computing 
equipment can be utilized to consolidate internal and external data points, such as 
suitability metrics, reliability block diagrams, or environmental indicators, in order to 
provide ordered analysis of the combat system’s current ability to achieve stated mission 
objectives.  
Enabling shore-based architecture allows the assessment to learn and become 
higher fidelity over time, eventually resulting in the answer to the singular outcome every 
stakeholder needs to know: “Does the system work?” 
A. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
1. Joint Environment 
Each constituent system in a complex System of Systems represents both 
production and consumption of data. A satellite communication system may consume data 
from an E-2D aircraft while also producing its own health and status information for 
internal or external use. An example of a complex integrated Operational View can be seen 
in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25. Sample Integrated Joint Tactical Environment. 
Source: Johnson (2019). 
The complexity of this joint environment and the adoption of concepts of 
distributed lethality (Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta 2015) means the complexity of 
mission readiness increasingly becomes more multi-layered. Analysis of how joint systems 
relate total mission readiness assessments will also become more complex. 
2. Failure Distribution 
Complex combat systems will inevitably be an amalgamation of diverse failure 
distributions and properties. A mechanical failure distribution of a cooling system is 
different from an electrical failure distribution, and the indicators of failure are different 
for different components and systems. 
Combining both external environmental inputs and system of systems failure 
propagation creates increasingly complex failure situations that present themselves as 
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opportunities for utilization of advanced techniques that adaptive analysis can attempt to 
solve. 
3. Complex System Failure
Kreinovich, et al. (2011) also define the set of information necessary to predict 
failure in complex systems as having a few key inputs:  
• when the failure of components and subsystems lead to the failure of the
complex system as a whole,
• reliability of components and subsystems, and
• whether the component failures independent events or they are caused by
a common cause
The essence of this statement can be extracted to a need for functional block 
diagrams, associated allocation of reliability to both systems and components as it relates 
to these functions, and identification of whether failure events are independent or linked. 
If assessing a system in a benign environment or during concept development, these pieces 
of information may be satisfactory. In a naval environment, there are additional inputs that 
will have a significant impact on performance. 
Furthermore, Kreinovich, et al. (2011) define various scenarios of SoS failures 
including when:  
• Component Failures are Independent and Failure Probabilities P(A) Are
Exactly Known
• Cases When We Know the Probabilities P(A) with Uncertainty
• Component Failures are Independent, Failure Probabilities P(A) Are
Known with Interval Uncertainty
Any of these situations are complex in and of themselves and assuming 
independence from external and internal variables that can further increase the variability. 
This complex system of system behavior should be studied. 
4. Software and Interface Considerations
As newer systems are being developed, adjustable parameters embedded within the 
delivered software code provide both flexibility and ambiguity, as they can be used to set 
thresholds of functionality tied to physical performance.  This functionality is largely 
driven by the ability to detect failure in systems.  Fault detection and isolation 
encompasses a broad range of practices.  Frequently, all of these practices include the 
utilization of sensors and software to run tests and search for prescribed value sets that 
correspond to “functional” or “not functional.”  The improvement of fault detection 
capability will ultimately drive more accurate data reporting and could be studied. 
Additionally, streaming information from the IoT in real-time is enabled 
by addressing constraints in the combat system themselves such as boundary 
defense, cybersecurity, built-in test capability, and mission to function mapping. 
Solutions to these problems have to be investigated. 
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APPENDIX.  CG (TICONDEROGA CLASS) REQUIRED 
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND PROJECTED OPERATING 
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